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NAFTA CHAPTER 19 BINATIONAL PANEL REVIEWS IN
MEXICO: A MARRIAGE OF TWO DISTINCT LEGAL
SYSTEMS
JIMMIE V. REYNA*

I.

INTRODUCTION

This paper' addresses certain issues related to the initial binational
panel reviews of Mexican final antidumping and countervailing duty
determinations under Chapter 19 of the North American Free Trade
Agreement2 (NAFTA).
This paper was initially intended to provide a broad overview of all
panel decisions involving reviews of U.S. and Mexican final antidumping
and countervailing duty determinations (jointly referred as "antidumping
duty determinations") similar to the U.S. General Accounting Office
(GAO) study3 on panel reviews under the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA).4 The GAO concluded in its study that the twenty-three
completed reviews were "too few to see if any patterns emerged.'' 5
Accordingly, as far fewer U.S. and Mexican panel reviews have been
completed under NAFTA, the scope of this paper was narrowed to two
issues: the application of national law by binational panelists, and the
potential emergence of a separate NAFTA Chapter 19 jurisprudence.
These issues are examined in the context of the binational panel reviews
of the final antidumping duty determinations in Steel Plate6 and Polystyrene, 7 the first two binational panel reviews completed in Mexico.
An issue that invariably arises in discussions concerning NAFTA binational panel reviews is whether foreign panelists can adequately apply
the national law of the importing country. NAFTA Article 1904 provides
that panel reviews must be based on the antidumping or countervailing
* Partner, Stewart & Stewart, Washington, D.C. Mr. Reyna received his law degree from the
University of New Mexico.
1. This paper is based on the oral presentation made by Mr. Reyna at the 1996 U.S.-Mexico
Law Institute. The opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of Mr. Reyna's
firm or its clients.
2. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex. (effective Jan. 1,
1994) 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993).
3. Gen. Acct. Office, U.S.-CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: FACTORS CONTRIBUTING To CONTROVERSY IN APPEALS OF TRADE REMEDY CASES To BINATIONAL PANELS, GAO/GGD-95-175BR,
(1995) [hereinafter GAO Study].
4. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988).
5. GAO Study, supra note 3, at 3.
6. Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate from the United States, Mex-95-1904-01, published
in the Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n, 11 de Septiembre de 1995 14 (hereinafter D.O.]; FTAPD
LEXIS
7. Crystal and Solid Polystyrene from the United States, MEX-94-1904-3, published in the D.O.,
4 de Noviembre de 1996, 4; 1996 FTAPD LEXIS 7.
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duty law of the importing country.8 While there has been some controversy
regarding the application of standard of review by binational panels, it
has not been made clear whether panelists in general do not understand,
or are unable to apply, the law of the importing country. 9 Indeed, the
GAO reported that there was an overall satisfaction with the expertise
and thoroughness of binational panelists. 0
II.

THE BINATIONAL PANEL PROCESS UNDER MEXICAN
LAW

The initial Mexican binational panel reviews have raised a number of
interesting issues related to whether panels apply the appropriate standard
of review. As the Steel Plate and Polystyrene reviews demonstrate, the
application of Mexican law by binational panels has been problematic,
primarily due to the differences between the legal systems of the United

States (and Canada) and Mexico and because Mexico's experience in
trade matters is not as developed as that of the United States and Canada.
One of Mexico's principal NAFTA negotiating objectives" was the
adoption of the trade dispute resolution mechanism established under
Chapter 19 of the FTA which was structured in accordance with the
U.S. and Canadian common law legal systems. As the FTA mechanism
was incorporated in the NAFTA with little change, Mexico was obligated
to make significant substantive revisions to its antidumping laws and

regulations in order to implement the binational process. 12 Those revisions,

however, were not sufficient to account for all the nuances that would
arise as a result of the fundamental differences between the Mexican
civil law code system and the common law structure of the binational

panel review process.

8. See NAFTA Article 1904(2) ("antidumping duty law" consists of the relevant statutes,
legislative history, regulations, administrative practice and judicial precedent to the extent that a
court of the importing party would rely on such materials in reviewing a final determination of
the competent investigating authority).
9. Concerns over whether binational panels have applied the appropriate standard of review
primarily focus on three FTA reviews involving frozen pork, live swine and lumber. See ECC 911904-01, ECC 93-1904-01, and ECC 94-1904-01.
10. GAO Study, supra note 3, at 55.
11.See e.g., TRATADO LiEE COMERCIO EN AMtRICA DEL NORTE, SOLUCI6N DE CONTROVERSIAS,
Monografia 3 (SECOFI 1991).
12. Canada and the United States revised their laws in order to include "Mexico" in the FTA
mechanism. By contrast, Mexico was required to adopt the due process provisions of the FTA
mechanism, including those related to:
(1) affording interested parties full participation in all stages of investigations,
administrative reviews, and panel and judicial reviews
(2) service of process, disclosure meetings, access to public and confidential information, ex-parte meetings
(3) maintenance of an administrative record, final determinations based on the
administrative record, publication of preliminary and final determinations,
determinations that set forth a factual and legal basis
(4) identification of the specific standard of review to be applied by binational
panels.
NAFTA Annex 1904.15, Schedule of Mexico.
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It is no surprise, therefore, that the initial panel reviews have involved
important issues novel under both Mexican law and the binational panel
process. When Mexico revised its domestic laws, it adopted a number
of foreign legal concepts that have no basis under the Mexican legal
system.' 3 In addition, while NAFTA Chapter 19 was designed to limit
the range of law applied in panel reviews, the Mexican legal system
requires the application of a significantly broader range of law than
applied in U.S. or Canadian reviews, a factor that has the potential to
create a perception that Mexican reviews are inconsistent with the letter
and spirit of NAFTA Chapter 19.
In the Steel Plate review, the panel ruled that the final antidumping
duty determination was null and void on grounds that, among other
reasons, the Secretarfa de Comercio y Fomento Industrial [Secretariat of
Commerce and Development] (SECOFI) was not competent in the early
stages of the underlying antidumping investigation. This ruling raised a
number of important and complex issues of first instance.
First, the panel had to determine the significance of competency in
the context of a binational panel review in Mexico. The term "competent
investigating authority" is used throughout NAFTA Article 1904.14 Its
meaning with respect to the United States and Canada is simple; in the
case of the United States, "competent investigating authority" means the
U.S. Department of Commerce International Trade Administration or
the U.S. International Trade Commission, and in the case of Canada it
means the Canadian International Trade Tribunal or the Deputy Minister
of National Revenue for Customs and Excise. 5 Under U.S. trade law,
the legal concept of "competency" is not a significant issue and, apparently, no antidumping duty determination has been remanded (or
reversed) on the basis that the investigating authority was not competent.
In Mexico's case "competent investigating authority" means the designated authority within SECOFI, a definition which appears the same
as that for Canada and the United States.' 6 Its apparent simplicity,
however, belies the significance of "competency" under Mexican law, 7
and the complexity involved in its interpretation and application. The
extent of that complexity, in addition to the formalism inherent in Mexican
law, is evident in the majority opinion in the Steel Plate review which
held that the authority within SECOFI that conducted the initial stages

13. For example: the requirement that the investigating authority maintain an administrative
record and base its final determination on that record and the requirement that reviews of final
determinations be made on the basis of the administrative record.
14. NAFTA, supra note 2, arts. 1904(2) and (3), 32 I.L.M. at 683.
15. NAFTA, supra note 2, Annex 1911, 27 I.L.M. at 692.
16. Id.
17. Generally, "competencia" refers to capacity of an authoritative organ to undertake or conduct
certain functions or legal acts. The legal interests of a person (or entity) may be affected only by
a written order by a competent authority. See "DMcloNARIo JRiDICO MaXsCANo," Instituto de
Investigaciones Juridicas, Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de Mexico Editorial Porrua (1996) at
542.
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of the underlying investigation had not been legally established and,
therefore, did not legally exist.'"
The Steel Plate panel decision on the competency issue raised two other
important issues of first instance. First, the panel had to decide the
extent, if any, of its authority to terminate the underlying antidumping
investigation. The NAFTA provides that a panel either may affirm a
final determination, or remand the determination to th investigating
authority for further action not inconsistent with its instructions.' 9 The
panel's decision regarding the competency of the investigating authority
had the effect of rendering the final determination null and void, and
of terminating the investigation and revoking the related outstanding
antidumping duty orders, an outcome not envisioned under the NAFTA.
Second, the panel had to determine the extent, if any, of its authority
to apply Articles 237, 238 and 239 of the Mexican Federal Fiscal Code.
in order to give effect to its competency decision.20 As noted above, the
NAFTA provides that a panel may either affirm or remand a determination, it does not provide for termination of an investigation. The Steel
panel decided that, in order to provide a remedy consistent with its
decision, it was required to apply the judgement guidelines contained in
Articles 237 and 239 of the Federal Fiscal Code. Since Articles 237 and
239 were invoked to give effect to a result not contemplated under the
NAFTA, i.e., termination, the question arose whether the application of
Articles 237 and 239 violated the express provisions of Chapter 19 and
constituted2 an improper extension of Article 238, the applicable standard
of review. '
The Steel Plate panel decision generated considerable public attention
in Mexico as it was widely perceived to have resulted from an application
of foreign legal concepts, i.e. American, to a Mexican proceeding. In
reality, the Steel Plate review involved the interpretation and application
of Mexican, not American, law. To astute observers of binational proceedings, the real interest concerned the effect of the decision within the
context of the NAFTA binational structure.
The Polystyrene review involved issues similar to those in Steel Plate.
During the Polystyrene review, Article 238 of the Federal Fiscal Code
was amended and a paragraph was added which, on grounds of public
order, granted the Tribunal Fiscal sua sponte authority to review the
competency of the authority that dictated the final determination .22 The
panel invoked the sua sponte authority and reviewed the competency of
the investigating authority. In reaching that determination, the panel had

18. In Steel Plate, the dissenting opinion contends that the NAFTA definition of "competent
authority" limits the scope of review on competency matters to the single issue of whether the final
determination was issued by a designated authority within SECOFI.
19. NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1904(8), 32 I.L.M. at 683.
20. "C6digo Fiscal de la Federaci6n," [C.F.F.], D.O., 31 de diciembre 1981 (as amended).
21. See NAFTA, supra note 2, Annex 1911, 32 I.L.M. at 692 (definitions for standard of
review).
22. This amendment was part of the December 1995 revisions to the Federal Fiscal Code which
went into effect on January 1, 1996.
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to balance the requirements of Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure23 with
the use of sua sponte authority set forth in the applicable standard of
review. Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure provides that the scope of a
panel review shall be limited to allegations of fact and law set out in
the complaint, including challenges to the jurisdiction of the investigating
authority, and procedural and substantive defenses raised in the panel
review. 24 Hence, the question before the panel was whether it was itself
competent to review the competency of the investigating authority. The
issue involved a whole range of issues of first instance under the binational
process and Mexican law, especially since the standard of review was
amended during the review and because the review involved the first time
Article 238 sua sponte authority was invoked to review the competency
of the investigating authority.
The difficulty inherent in the resolution of the issues presented in the
Steel Plate and Polystyrene cases was compounded by the (understandable)
lack of administrative determinations and judicial opinions which the
panelists and parties could rely for meaningful guidance. Compared to
the United States and Canada, whose unfair trade systems date back to
the turn of this century, Mexico's unfair trade system is relatively young.
Mexico acceded to the GATF 5 in 1986 at which time it adopted the
GATT Antidumping Code. Since its accession to the GATT, the number
of trade cases brought in Mexico increased steadily, and by the mid1990's Mexico had become one of the world's leading countries in the
use of antidumping duty remedies.
In U.S. reviews, the panelists and parties typically have an abundance
of judicial opinions and administrative cases to apply and interpret. This
is not the case in Mexican reviews. Despite the large number of antidumping investigations brought in Mexico during the 1990's, by the end
of 1996, the Tribunal Fiscal had yet to complete a review of an antidumping duty determination. Moreover, because the NAFTA entered into
effect in 1994, there is nominal administrative and judicial experience in
Mexico with respect to the NAFTA requirement that final antidumping
duty determinations be based on the administrative record and that reviews
of final determinations be made on the basis of the administrative record.
In any event, Article 1904 provides that a panel must apply the
applicable standard of review, the antidumping duty law, and the general
legal principles that a court of the importing party would apply to a
review of the final determination. 2 6 The term "antidumping duty law"

23. See Rules of Procedure for Article 1904 Binational Panel Review, 59 Fed. Reg. 8686 (Dept.
Comm. 1994).
24. The English version of the Rules of Procedure uses the word "jurisdiction" while the Spanish
version uses the word "competency," as if the two words are interchangeable, which they are not.
See Reglas de procedimiento del articulo 1904 y del Comite de Impugnaci6n Extraordinaria del
Tratado de Libre Comercio de America del Norte, D.O., 20 de junio de 1994, 13.
25. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-1l, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
26. NAFTA, supra note 2, arts. 1904(2) and (3), 32 I.L.M. at 683.
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includes legislative histories, administrative practices, and judicial precedents, all concepts that have a rich application in common law.
In Mexico, "legislative histories" are not as expansive as in the United
States or Canada, and courts do not generally rely on legislative histories
for statutory construction purposes. The concept of "administrative practices" as understood under U.S. administrative law does not exist in
Mexican administrative law, and a judicial "precedent" is established
when the Mexican Supreme Court, or the Federal Circuit Courts, consistently decide the same point in five consecutive separate cases. This
means that there is little judicial "precedent" in trade matters.
In view of the foregoing, Mexico's initial experience under the binational
process may support a perception that panel reviews in Mexico involve
an irreconcilable conflict of two distinct legal systems. This renders the
binational panel process meaningless. Such a perception, however, would
be erroneous. While the Mexican reviews may appear aberrant to persons
unfamiliar with civil code legal systems, it is unreasonable to expect
Mexican reviews to mirror U.S. (or Canadian) reviews, or otherwise
involve familiar sounding issues. There is no indication that different
results would have been obtained had the reviews been conducted by the
Tribunal Fiscal. Indeed, that the initial reviews involved difficult and
novel issues demonstrates the characteristics of integrity and independence
desired of panels, and are factors that strengthen and lend credibility to
the binational panel review process.
III.

A SEPARATE BINATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE

During the debate on the passage of NAFTA, considerable attention
was devoted to the notion that the binational panel process should not
result in a distinct jurisprudence. 27 This concern is reflected in NAFTA
Article 1904, which specifies the standard of review to be applied by
panels and which requires that panels
apply the law that a court of the
28
importing country would apply.
The GAO addressed the issue of the development of a separate jurisprudence in its study of the FTA binational panel process. 29 To determine whether a separate jurisprudence was developing, the GAO reviewed
the frequency in which panels cited other panel decisions.30 The GAO
found that panels frequently cite to other panel decisions, but it could
not determine the extent to which panels were substantively influenced
by other panel decisions.

27. For example, in the NAFTA Statement of Administrative Action, the Administration explained
to Congress that the NAFTA preference for judges and former judges to serve as panelists would
help ensure that panels would review final determinations precisely as would the courts of the
importing country, and would diminish the possibility that panels and courts will develop distinct
bodies of law. H.R. Doc. 105-159, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 644 (1993).
28. NAFTA, supra note 2, arts. 1904(2) and (3), 32 I.L.M. at 683.
29. GAO Study, supra note 3, at 80.
30. The GAO stated that the issue of the development of a "separate case law outside the scope
and control of the U.S. judicial system is a complex question." Id. at 81.
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The issue of whether the binational process will result in a distinct
body of jurisprudence in Mexico is, for the moment, moot. As noted
above, when Mexico implemented the NAFTA, it revised its antidumping
laws to incorporate antidumping procedures almost identical to the U.S.
system. To date, only binational panels have completed reviews of Mexican
final determinations issued since the passage of the NAFTA. As a result,
the only jurisprudence in Mexico related to Article 238 reviews of final
determinations issued since the NAFTA entered into force is that contained
in binational panel decisions. This circumstance will change only to the
extent that parties in Mexico bypass the binational panel process and
resort to reviews by the Tribunal Fiscal.

